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Abstract
This paper details an approach to verifying time dependent authen
tication properties of security protocols We discuss the introduction of
time into the Communicating Sequential Processes CSP protocol veri
cation framework of 	
 The embedding of CSP in the theorem prover
PVS Prototype Verication System is extended to incorporate event
based time retaining the use of the existing rank function approach to
verify such properties An example analysis is demonstrated using the
WideMouthed Frog protocol
  Introduction
There are many methods that model and analyse security policies of distributed
systems Typically the policies concerning communication are achieved using
security protocols in which the agents of a system are trusted to provide a degree
of secure communication across the systems network
The complexity of security protocols and the size of distributed systems have
often been too great for analyses without a great deal of abstraction This can
lead to oversimplication and the possibility of missing some sizedependent
aws This is prevented in analyses in which a potentially innite	 number of
agents can engage in arbitrarily many possibly concurrent	 runs of a security
protocol
Model checking via highly automated tools has proved to be an invaluable
ally to those who wish to analyse protocols by searching for attacks However
justifying the correctness of a protocol from a model checking analysis is more
di
cult because it is usually impossible the explore the entire state space In
deed to explore any reasonable amount of state space one is often required to
approximate the model by considering individual runs of the protocol with the
minimal number of agents
Theorem proving on the other hand does not suer from the state space
problem It is easier to justify protocol correctness via a successful proof than it
is to extract an attack from an unsuccessful proof Assuming that the protocols

of the future will not fail as readily as current protocols these are obviously
desirable qualities The main disadvantage of theorem proving is the need for
intense user intervention Current tool support technology for theorem proving
provides relatively little automation though the situation is improving Two
general purpose theorem provers that have been used in the context of security
protocol analysis are Isabelle  and PVS  in this paper we will use the
latter
In these analyses time is often abstracted from the protocol descriptions and
from the properties that are proven about them However there are situations in
which sensitivity to time is required for an appropriate analysis either because
the protocol exhibits some timedependent behaviour for example comparing
a received value of a timestamp with the current time or using timeouts and
delays in its ow of control	 or because the required property is concerned with
time for example that a ticket accepted by an authorising agent has not yet
expired	
Introducing time into a protocol analysis framework brings complications
The use of explicit time increases the state space of the system by a signicant
factor which means that for modelchecking either even simpler versions of
the protocol need to be analysed or else more powerful computers or larger
timescales are required to perform an appropriate analysis The introduction
of explicit time in theoremproving approaches generally introduces time as an
additional datatype but the special nature of time imposes restrictions on its
use and requires that care should be taken to ensure that it is modelled in
sensible and realistic ways This is feasible when it is used in simple ways
such as simply providing timestamps and checking if they are recent	 but the
more complex the timedependent behaviour the less condence we can have
in adhoc approaches to introducing time
In this paper we shall introduce eventbased time into the process modelling
language CSP and we shall extend the corresponding embedding of CSP in the
theorem prover PVS  to incorporate this approach to time One benet of the
CSP approach is that the theory of timewise renement  allows results to be
translated between the untimed and timed models enabling verications to be
carried out at their most appropriate level of abstraction and then combined if
necessary from dierent models The timed model will be illustrated by proving
a time dependent property of the WideMouthed Frog protocol 
 Review of Previous Work
  Communicating Sequential Processes
CSP is a modelling language that allows the description of systems of interacting
processes by means of a few language primitives Processes execute and interact
by means of performing events drawn from a universal set  Some events are
of the form c v  where c represents a channel and v represents a value being
passed along that channel This allows messages to be communicated between
processes
The process Stop is a stopped processit can perform no events The process
RUN
A
is the process that will repeatedly be able to perform any event in the
set of events A The process a   P is initially willing to perform the event

a and then behave subsequently as P  The input process cx   Px 	 will
accept a value x along channel P and then behave subsequently as Px 	 The
output process cv   P will output v along channel c and then behave as P  In
general communications and channels can have any number of message elds
For example rec a b m can represent a channel rec a carrying a message b m
The choice P   Q oers the choice between processes P and Q  P jA jQ
executes P and Q in parallel where they must synchronise on all events in the
set Athis is how processes interact with each other Processes may also be
dened by means of recursive denitions
Each CSP process description is identied with its set of traces the se
quences of events that it can perform For example the process inx   out x  
Stop has hin  out  i as a possible trace but not hin  out  i it cannot output
 after inputting 
A specication S tr	 is a predicate on traces A process P satises a spec
ication written P sat S tr	 if all of its traces meet the predicate Trace
specications are used to capture safety requirements on processes they re
quire that all executions should be of a particular form and hence that no
execution should violate the specication
   Embedding CSP into PVS
A PVS ascii syntax is provided for the CSP operators described above among
others	 Since we are interested in safety properties of security protocols a CSP
process is represented by its trace semantics in PVS That is given a xed set
 of all possible events a process is represented by the set of traces of events
from  that could be observed at the process interface Recursive denitions
are also possible by dening a monotonic functional H and then using the xed
point operator mu to generate its least xed point muH A typecorrectness
condition TCC	 is generated by PVS requiring a proof of Hs monotonicity
This is straightforward as all the CSP operators described above are monotonic
with respect to their operand processes
PVS support is provided in the form of theory les for general CSP trace
semantics as follows
 Traces
 Fixed point theory
 CSP operators
 specication and the sat relation
  Analysing security protocols
A protocol is described in CSP in terms of the activity required of the partic
ipating agents which may include servers and trusted third parties as well as
parties that want to communicate They are described in terms of the messages
they send along trans channels and receive along rec channels and the manip
ulations they carry out on those messages For example the protocol which has
user A signing a nonce challenge with a signature key s
A
would be described by
USER
A
 rec Ajn   trans Aj fng
s
A
  Stop

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Figure  Communication in a hostile environmentthe DolevYao model
In this description USER
A
receives a nonce n apparently from j  on its receive
channel rec A It responds by transmitting fng
s
A
back to j along its transmit
channel trans A and nishes We use fmg
k
to denote message m encrypted
with key k 
To analyse the protocol in the context of a possibly hostile environment we
use the DolevYao model of a network  In this framework the set of agent
processes communicate with each other only by passing messages on the trans
and rec channels to an enemy that is in full control of the communications
medium He has the potential to block redirect duplicate or fake messages on
the medium When cooperating with a user the enemy accepts messages on the
agents transmitting channel trans and passes the message to the appropriate
agents receiving channel rec This architecture is depicted in Figure 
To capture the enemys ability to produce new messages a generates re
lation  is dened allowing a new message m to be generated from a set
of messages S  already known This is written as S  m This model of
communication is dened in CSP by allowing agents to communicate with the
enemy using transmission and reception events only trans i  j  m is interpreted
as agent i attempting to send message m to agent j  and rec i  j  m means agent
i receives message m apparently from agent j  The enemy is dened as a CSP
process that is willing to synchronise with all agents on trans and rec events
Any message received by the enemy a trans event	 is added to his set of knowl
edge Any message the enemy intends to send a rec event	 must have been
generated from his set of knowledge using the relation  This is dened in the
PVS embedding by the process enemy dened recursively by the function F 
enemyS	  Fenemy	S	
FXS  process 
Choice i j m  transi j m  Xaddm S
	
 Choice i j m  S  m  reci j m  XS
enemy  setmessage  process  muF
In  the network is dened as a CSP process NET which is the parallel

combination synchronising on trans and rec	 of the enemy together with all of
the protocol agents and their possible communication partners In PVS this is
expressed as follows
network  process 
Partrans OR recenemyINIT InterleaveUSER
where USER  Identity  process is the function dening the behaviour
of all agents running the protocol and INIT is the enemys initial knowledge
set
Having dened the protocol in the worst possible environment it is now
possible to analyse the traces of this system and investigate whether certain
properties relating to authentication hold
  Authentication properties
We take a messagebased approach to authentication in order to enable a for
mal analysis We say that one set of messages T authenticates another set of
messages R if occurrence of a message in T guarantees that some message in R
previously occurred This is easily expressed as a property on traces if a trace
contains a message in the set T  then it should also contain a previous message
in the set R
By choosing appropriate T and R we can express properties on the entire
system NET that give various avours of authentication For example if T 
frec B  A mg and R  ftrans A B  mg then for NET to meet this property it
must be the case that whenever USER
B
receives message m apparently from A
then USER
A
did indeed earlier transmit this message to user B  Clearly this
will not be true for arbitrary messages since if the enemy can generate m then
he can pass it to USER
B
as if it had come from user A So an authentication
protocol designed to provide this property will have to design the authenticating
message m appropriately
A signicant body of theory  has been developed on top of CSP trace
theory for verifying properties of this type This is based around nding a rank
function which assigns an integer value to each possible message in such a way
that all messages that might ever appear in a protocol run have positive rank
and only messages that can never appear have nonpositive rank Thus the
enemy can only ever generate positive rank messages if it only ever has positive
rank messages and protocol agents must be shown to preserve positive rank
never introducing nonpositive rank messages if they are never provided with
them If all occurrences of R within the system are blocked then we aim to
nd a rank function where all messages in T have rank  establishing that they
cannot occur in the restricted system Thus for any T to occur and R must
occur previously
This body of CSP theory has also been provided and veried within PVS
 in the following PVS theories
 authentication properties
 rank function properties
 enemy denition

 network denition and authentication theorem
 event datatypes
 rules for restricted parallel combinations implemented from 	
 rules for maintaining positive rank implemented from 	
The way PVS is used in practise is to nd rank functions where they exist	 by
carrying out a proof for the protocol in question providing only a blank rank
function and then reducing all of the proof obligations on the correctness of
the protocol to requirements on the rank function These requirements often
point the way to construction of a rank function or alternatively they might be
shown to be contradictory if the protocol is awed and might point the way to
an attack
The entire body of theory described thus far does not provide any general
theoretical framework for handling time in the protocol descriptions or in the
properties the system should meet The contribution of this paper is the exten
sion of the framework to include time
 Eventbased Time
Time can be introduced into CSP in a number of ways The most natural from
the theoretical point of view would be to use the approach of Timed CSP 
which is a mature modelling language in its own right This approach integrates
realtime in the form of the real numbers into the CSP language and results
in sophisticated but complex semantic model which would require much of the
PVS framework to be redeveloped
The other main approach which is preferred in modelchecking approaches
because of the discrete nature of time	 is to introduce a new special event tock
into the alphabet of all processes The resulting language is called tockCSP
The event tock is used to represent the passage of one unit of time and must be
synchronised on by all processes in the system to reect the fact that time passes
at the same rate in all processes Delays are introduced by requiring a number
of tocks to occur and other timesensitive behaviour such as timeout is also
easily modelled in this framework For example a fragment of a process which
is repeatedly awaiting input but which will timeout and retransmit a value v if
input is not received within one time unit might be described as
Pv	  inx   Qx 	   tock   out v   Pv	
A detailed account of eventbased time with illustrative examples can be found
in 
By using an explicit event to mark the passage of time it is easier to integrate
the handling of time into the existing PVS framework for CSP which is based
purely on events
The modelling of time using this special event introduces some features that
must be treated carefully Care must be taken when dening processes in a timed
environment A process with no tock events does not mean that it is indierent
to the passage of time but rather that it does not allow the passage of time
In our setting all agents must synchronise on tock and none of them should

have the power to impede time Therefore process denitions that prevent tock
events suggest a aw in the network model
The urgent events of a process are events that occur before any tock event is
possible They are urgent because they must be performed immediately	 It is
essential that urgent events are not blocked an uncooperative environment that
blocks an urgent event would prevent the occurrence of any tock events When
using CSP to describe a process it is therefore essential to include su
cient
tock events to ensure such blocking does not occur and that only events which
should be urgent are indeed modelled in this way
For example the onepass copy process described in CSP as
OPC  inx   out x   Stop
does not allow any time to pass at all since it has no tock events in its descrip
tion Since in should not be urgent it should allow any number of tocks to
occur before in If out is also not urgent then the appropriate description in
tockCSP would be
TOPC  inx   TOPC x 	
  tock   TOPC
TOPC x 	  out x   RUN
tock
  tock   TOPC x 	
Conversely if the message should be passed on as soon as it is received so out
is urgent	 then the description should be
TOPC
 
 inx   out x   RUN
tock
  tock  TOPC
 
Once in occurs then out must occur before any more time passes It is essential
that the rest of the system does not block out  or else the model will contain a
timestop state
The translation mechanism  from  provides a systematic way of trans
lating CSP processes P into tockCSP processes P	 so that all of the events
are nonurgent The resulting process can either perform one of the enabled
events or else it can perform a tock event and remain in the same state For
example OPC 	  TOPC  This mechanism allows processes without time
critical behaviour to be described in CSP and then translated naturally into
tockCSP
Adding eventbased time to the PVS embedding of CSP causes no problems
because all of the theories concerning this embedding are parameterised by the
event type Only two changes were made to the original set of theories dening
the embedding Firstly a tock constructor was added to the abstract datatype
dening the CSP events in PVS Secondly a PVS denition of the RUN process
as used in the translation mechanism above	 was added allowing it to be viewed
as a primitive process in a timed setting in the same way that Stop is viewed in
an untimed setting
 
 The Timed Network Model
We retain the DolevYao model of the network in which the enemy is in full
control of the communicationsmedium and the agents continue to communicate
with each other via the enemy The revised enemy is simply the original enemy
with time added by means of  the most general enemy has no timecritical
behaviour
However protocol agents behaviour can be sensitive to time for a number
of reasons
 The values they produce eg timestamps	 can depend on the current
time and so the agents will have to be described explicitly in tockCSP
rather than as untimed CSP descriptions translated through  In fact
they will need to keep track of the current time and increment it on every
tock
 The response to a particular message might depend on the relationship
between the current time and a time value within the message usually to
check that it is recent enough	
 The implementation of the protocol might include timedependent be
haviour such as timeouts or explicit delays
In such cases the CSP description of the protocol cannot be given purely as an
untimed process translated through  Instead the timed behaviour will have
to be described explicitly as a tockCSP process Section  gives an example of
how this is done
Furthermore time can be introduced into the authentication properties that
need to be checked It may be necessary to check that a message received was
in fact sent relatively recently or perhaps that an entire protocol run has taken
no more than a certain amount of time If timestamps appear in the messages
then such properties can be expressed within the existing framework of using
one set of messages T to authenticate another set R For example if m is a
message and l is a timestamp then frec B  A m lgmight be used to authenticate
ftrans A B  m l
 
j l  d   l
 
  lg that the message was sent with a timestamp
l
 
between l  d and l 
Since the central rank function theorem remains true in the timed frame
work as has been proved in PVS	 this means that the existing rank function
approach can be applied to verify that a timesensitive protocol satises a timed
authentication property expressed in this way
 An Example Analysis
The WideMouthed Frog protocol is a simple protocol that uses timestamps Its
aim is to send a session key from one agent to another via a server using shared
key cryptography Timestamps indicate how recently a message was sent The
informal denition taken from 	 is stated as follows
	 A  S  A fB TaKabg
Kas
	 S   B  fATsKab	g
Kbs

where Ta and Ts are timestamps Kas is the key that A shares with S  Kbs is
B s shared key and Kab is a new session key generated by A Both the server
S  and the receiver of message  B in this case check that the timestamps lie
within a specied range If either message is too old then the session key is
ignored
From this description we gather information about the types of messages
involved the capabilities of the enemy and the denition of the agents
 The Agents
In general an agent i can either initiate a protocol run with another agent via
the server	 or he can respond to an agent who chooses to initiate a run of the
protocol with i  In this case the word respond is somewhat misleading because
the agent receiving the message in a protocol run does not give any response
However we shall continue to use it to distinguish between the roles of the agents
and to be consistent with the terminology of examples in the literature The
server does not behave like an initiator or a responder and therefore requires
a separate process denition
We allow an agent to initiate and respond to arbitrarily many runs of the
protocol UINIT and URESP describe an initiator and a responder run re
spectively The numeric arguments of SERVER UINIT and URESP represent the
current time  ie we can view the agents as having synchronised clocks These
values are incremented for each tock event
The denitions of UINIT and URESP are straightforward Each deals with one
nonurgent message and so follows the style of the  translation in ensuring
that tock is always possible For example UINUT i  j  k	l	 representing a user
i at time l wishing to send key k to user j via the server S 	 is dened in CSP
as follows
UINIT i  j  k	l	  trans i S i  fj  l  kg
k
is
	   RUN
tock
  tock  UINIT i  j  k	l ! 	
This is expressed in PVS explicitly as the xed point of the function FUINIT
The responder is expressed in a similar style We use Ekm to denote in ascii
form the encrypted message fmg
k

Y  VAR nat  processevent
FUINITi j kYl  process 
transi s concuseri
Esharedi concuserj timel sessionk
 RUNtock
	

tock  Yl  
UINITi j k  nat  process  muFUINITi j k
FURESPiYl  process 
Choice j k l  nat  l  l AND l  l  d 
reci s Esharedi concuserj timel sessionk

 RUNtock
	

tock  Yl  
URESPi  nat  process  muFURESPi
Note that in FURESP we use PVSs dependent type capability to capture the
notion a recent message the responding agent is willing to accept any mes
sage apparently from the server s	 whose timestamp value l lies between the
current time l and the time l  d for a delay constant d
The denition for SERVER requires the response to the receipt of a message
to be urgent and hence prevents a tock from occurring until the trans event
has occurred The server also performs the same check as the responder that
the timestamp l on the received message is no older than d units of time
FSERVERYl  process 
Choice i j k l  nat  l  l AND l  l  d
recs i concuseri
Esharedi concuserj timel sessionk 
transs j Esharedj concuseri timel sessionk
 RUNtock
	

tock  Yl  
SERVER  nat  process  muFSERVER
It is appropriate to make the trans event urgent because the server has
control over when the messages are sent The enemy never blocks trans events
so no timestampwill occur On the other hand rec events should not be urgent
since this would imply that the agent controls the time that messages must be
received
  The Authentication Property
The property that we shall analyse is the following if agent b responds to a
message containing timestamp value t then the protocol run was initiated at or
after a time t  d where d is the delay constant Note that t would be the
timestamp generated by the server This is achieved by dening the sets T and
R as
T  setmevent 
 e  e  recb s EKbs concA timet Kab 
R  setevent 
 e  EXISTS l  nat  t  l AND l  t  d 
e  transa s concA EKas concB timel Kab 
The theorem that we want to prove is
authenticated  THEOREM networkenemyINIT USER  authT R
Now we have everything we need to perform the analysis except a denition
for the rank function rho if one exists In the usual way we shall initially

declare rho as an uninterpreted function and then use the PVS theorem prover
to extract the conditions that rho must satisfy It is from these conditions that
we can either build a rank function to complete the proof or show because of
a contradiction in the conditions that no rank function exists indicating the
possibility of an attack	
In fact in attempting to construct a rank function we nd that the following
derived condition is required
authenticated 
 t  l
 l  t  d

 l  t
This is true only when d is  The problem is caused by the similarity in the
messages that the server receives and the subsequent messages he transmits
In fact when d   we can prove that the conditions required of the rank
function are contradictory and so we can conclude that no rank function can
be constructed From these derived conditions it is possible to see the attack
A  S  A fB TaKabg
Kas
S   I B	  fATa ! d Kabg
Kbs
I B	   S  B  fATa ! d Kabg
Kbs
S   I A	  fB Ta ! d Kabg
Kas
S   I B	  A fB Ta ! d Kabg
Kas
S   B  fATa ! d Kabg
Kbs
The enemy can intercept a message sent by the server and after prexing the
appropriate user identity to the message send it back to the server as an initiator
message He can repeat this more than once providing that each interception
occurs within the time delay d The eect of this is to keep the messages
timestamp recent even though the age of the message could be more than the
acceptable delay d This delaying tactic makes it possible for b to receive the
message containing the key kab with timestamp Tad ie the event in T	
even if the events in R ie a transmitting with a timestamp between Tad
and Tad	 are blocked since the original transmission with timestamp Ta is
not blocked If as is implied by our problematic subgoals d is set to zero then
the problem does not arise because the enemy would have to act immediately
and the message would not age However setting d to be zero would be an
unrealistic assumption
The alternative solution to this problem is to add an extra eld to the en
crypted part of the messages to distinguish between the initiator and responder
messages That is the modied protocol becomes
	 A  S  A fB TaKab initiateg
Kas
	 S   B  fATsKab respondg
Kbs
The corresponding modication to our PVS denition conrms this rerunning
the proof easily yields a rank function which successfully veries the amended
protocol

 Discussion
Introducing time
This report has documented the generalisation of the PVS embedding of CSP
presented in 	 by implementing eventbased time This allows the analysis of
protocols that use timestamps in order to full one or more security properties
In our example the intended property is the freshness of a session key However
it is still possible to analyse security protocols that have no time critical features
and existing proofs of authentication properties for untimed protocols have been
repeated in the timed setting without modication
The strength of the framework is that it will also allow more complicated
timedependent behaviour of the protocol agents to be expressed naturally and
analysed Protocols when modelled for analysis are generally implicitly	 con
sidered to halt if they do not make progress Yet their implementations may
use a timeout mechanism which triggers retransmission of a message a number
of times before eventually giving up on the protocol Such mechanisms might
have a bearing on protocol correctness particularly where timestamps are in
volved and a framework for describing and analysing them will be of benet
Investigation of such examples is the subject of ongoing research
Other theoremproving and modelchecking approaches such as those de
scribed in     among others do not oer this benet explicitly though
it should be possible to extend their work to a general framework for handling
timecritical behaviour of protocols for example by modelling timeouts by use of
timeout events which may or may not contain specic time values	 However
the coding up required would make the complex behaviour di
cult to under
stand and it is preferable to use a language designed to express such realtime
behaviour
Lowes Casper tool  allows timed authentication properties to be checked
by including a separate clock process within the model and requiring that every
event involving time should synchronise with the clock to ensure the correct
value Thus protocol agents are not themselves described as timed processes
but they treat time values as they do other data values and use the clock as the
time server Similarly Paulson denes the timestamp provided on a message
in terms of a function of the events that have already occurred which is akin
to Lowes approach in the sense that the time value is obtained from some
source external to the protocol Again time values are considered as data
values and timecritical behaviour such as timeouts are not expressed within
this framework Strand spaces  can handle timestamps but would need
times associated with all messages even those without timestamps	 in order
to handle timecritical agent behaviour The NRL Protocol Analyser does not
currently handle timestamps though they can and will	 be introduced by means
of coding up what is essentially a global clock  
PVS
The PVS type system is very expressive and makes theory denitions more
succinct We have used subtyping to generalise the set of events in our CSP
embedding Events are now either value passing trans and rec are events
that enable the exchange of messages	 or pure synchronisations such as tock

events	 Our example analysis has demonstrated the use of dependent types in
process denitions Recall that messages containing a timestamp were received
only if their timestamp values were recent according to a numeric argument
representing the current time
Altering the features of an existing PVS theory can be a nontrivial time
consuming exercise Changes that are made to theories at the lower levels of a
theory hierarchy can have a detrimental eect on the established proofs of the
orems higher up the proof chain The use of PVSs statusproof commands
helps to indicate which proofs are aected If after the change a lemmas sta
tus becomes unfinished then one can deduce that the change has had a direct
eect on the lemma Otherwise if its status becomes provedincomplete then
there is an indirect eect on the lemma the proof still works but refers to other
unfinished lemmas	 In our case the addition of tock events has an indi
rect	 impact on the PVS implementation of the central authentication theorem
However this work on the underlying theory needs to be done only once and
the payo is a more general approach framework for analysing more classes of
authentication protocol In particular a PVS proof shows that the central rank
function theorem remains true in the more general semantic framework
The following diagramgives an approximationof the hierarchy of the theories
that are inuenced by the modication of the event datatype This is just a
small part of the total hierarchy because the theories that occur lower down
such as the denitions of the CSP trace semantics	 are unaected by changes
to event In fact they are polymorphic with respect to events	
event datatype
Network definition
and authentication
theorem
enemy 
definition
assignment of each
agent’s local events
rank function
properties
general properties
of event traces
The PVS environment also provides some useful features that have assisted
the development of this project In particular the proof status commands are
a source of information
The theorem prover is used in an analysis to derive the conditions that must
be satised by a rank function prior to its construction These conditions are
the leaves of the open branches of the proof tree Our analysis has shown that
a set of conditions can be inconsistent signifying that no such rank function
can be constructed We have also shown that once a rank function has been
dened it can be used to close the branches of the proof tree The PVS strategy
GRIND can be used to close such branches However it is common for GRIND to

generate multiple subgoals from one condition and closing these branches can
be very tedious
Future Work
Investigation of this framework will benet from a more signicant example in
which protocol agents exhibit timecritical behaviour This does not require
analysis of new protocols but rather analysis of existing protocols in which the
realtime behaviour of agents such as retransmission on timeout is modelled
explicitly rather than abstracted away We need to understand the impact
these implementation issues can have on protocol correctness and may be able
to obtain some general results about timing mechanisms
As a tool for protocol analysis this approach is not user friendly The whole
approach could benet from a Casperstyle interface  that allows a rened
level of interaction The construction of more specialised strategies that hide
individual steps of a proof whilst allowing the user to intervene when some se
curity or rank function expertise is needed This automates the process and
makes it more amenable to those with limited PVS knowledge by allowing com
munication at a level higher than primitive prover commands
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